Book Reviews

The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.     

A RANDOM RATIONING MECHANISM WHICH REDUCES THE RISKS OF NO SON LEFT AT HOME

This paper empirically re‐examines the long‐run co‐movements and the causal relationships between GDP and defence expenditures in a multivariate model with real defence expenditure per capita (ME), real GDP per capita (GDP), and real capital stock per capita (K). We apply the view of the aggregate production function to construct the empirical model. Using up‐to‐date data for 27 OECD countries and 62 non‐OECD countries for the 1988–2003 period, we combine cross‐sectional and time series data to re‐investigate the relationship between GDP and ME. Previous studies using time series data may have yielded misleading results on account of the short time span of typical datasets. By contrast, we use recently developed panel unit root tests and heterogeneous panel cointegration tests, and conclude that there is fairly strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis of a long‐run equilibrium relationship between GDP and ME. The long‐run panel regression parameter results, such as the fully modified OLS, indicate that a positive relationship between GDP and ME only holds for OECD countries, whereas a negative relationship from ME to GDP only exists in non‐OECD countries under examination and in the panel as a whole. Furthermore, by implementing the dynamic panel‐based error correction model, we determine that GDP and ME lack short‐run causalities, but do show long‐run bidirectional causalities in both OECD and non‐OECD countries.     

THE LONG‐RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GDP IN TAIWAN

Using the Solow–Swan growth model and the time‐trend included in the aggregate production function, this study applies the multivariate cointegration approach to re‐investigate the long‐run and causal relationships between defence expenditures and GDP while controlling for capital and labour input in Taiwan during the 1955–2002 period. It examines the long‐run causal relationship using the weak exogeneity test and utilizes general impulse response functions to determine whether a shock to defence expenditures affects economic growth or vice versa. Our findings provide substantive evidence in favour of the existence of a long‐run equilibrium cointegrated relationship between defence expenditures, GDP, labour and capital stock. The results of the weak exogeneity test indicate that a bi‐directional causal relationship exists in the long‐run between defence expenditures and GDP. Thus, the main policy implication that emerges from the long‐run results is that increasing defence expenditures in Taiwan is an effective means to boost overall economic performance and, with this improved economy, it should then be able to increase its defence expenditures further. Lastly, from our dynamic vector error correction model estimations, it is found that defence expenditures are a major means of adjusting for disequilibria that occur within the system.     

9/11: WHAT DID WE KNOW AND WHEN DID WE KNOW IT?

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden published a signed statement calling for a fatwa against the United States for its having ‘declared war against God’. As we now know, the fatwa resulted in the unprecedented attack of 9/11. The issue of whether or not 9/11 was in any way predictable culminated in the public debate between Richard Clarke, former CIA Director George Tenet and the White House. This paper examines whether there was any evidence of a structural change in the terrorism data at or after February 1998 but prior to June 2001, controlling for the possibility of other breaks in earlier periods. In doing so, we use the standard Bai–Perron procedure and our sequential importance sampling (SIS) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for identifying an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates. We conclude that sophisticated statistical time‐series analysis would not have predicted 9/11.     

A mathematical formulation and efficient heuristics for the dynamic container relocation problem

The container relocation problem (CRP) is concerned with emptying a single yard‐bay which contains J containers each following a given pickup order so as to minimize the total number of relocations made during their retrieval process. The CRP can be modeled as a binary integer programming (IP) problem and is known to be NP‐hard. In this work, we focus on an extension of the CRP to the case where containers are both received and retrieved from a single yard‐bay, and call it the dynamic container relocation problem. The arrival (departure) sequences of containers to (from) the yard‐bay is assumed to be known a priori. A binary IP formulation is presented for the problem. Then, we propose three types of heuristic methods: index based heuristics, heuristics using the binary IP formulation, and a beam search heuristic. Computational experiments are performed on an extensive set of randomly generated test instances. Our results show that beam search heuristic is very efficient and performs better than the other heuristic methods.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 101–118, 2014     

Selling to strategic and loss‐averse consumers: Stocking,procurement, and product design policies

Motivated by the presence of loss‐averse decision making behavior in practice, this article considers a supply chain consisting of a firm and strategic consumers who possess an S‐shaped loss‐averse utility function. In the model, consumers decide the purchase timing and the firm chooses the inventory level. We find that the loss‐averse consumers' strategic purchasing behavior is determined by their perceived gain and loss from strategic purchase delay, and the given rationing risk. Thus, the firm that is cognizant of this property tailors its inventory stocking policy based on the consumers' loss‐averse behavior such as their perceived values of gain and loss, and their sensitivity to them. We also demonstrate that the firm's equilibrium inventory stocking policy reflects both the economic logic of the traditional newsvendor inventory model, and the loss‐averse behavior of consumers. The equilibrium order quantity is significantly different from those derived from models that assume that the consumers are risk neutral and homogeneous in their valuations. We show that the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior tends to keep an unnecessarily high inventory level that leads to excessive leftovers. Our numerical experiments further reveal that in some extreme cases the firm that ignores strategic consumer's loss‐aversion behavior generates almost 92% more leftovers than the firm that possesses consumers’ loss‐aversion information and takes it into account when making managerial decisions. To mitigate the consumer's forward‐looking behavior, we propose the adoption of the practice of agile supply chain management, which possesses the following attributes: (i) procuring inventory after observing real‐time demand information, (ii) enhanced design (which maintains the current production mix but improves the product performance to a higher level), and (iii) customized design (which maintains the current performance level but increases the variety of the current production line to meet consumers’ specific demands). We show that such a practice can induce the consumer to make early purchases by increasing their rationing risk, increasing the product value, or diversifying the product line. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 435–453, 2015     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

Bounding the optimal burn‐in time for a system with two types of failure

Burn‐in is a widely used method to improve the quality of products or systems after they have been produced. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining bounds to the optimal burn‐in time and optimal replacement policy maximizing the steady state availability of a repairable system. It is assumed that two types of system failures may occur: One is Type I failure (minor failure), which can be removed by a minimal repair, and the other is Type II failure (catastrophic failure), which can be removed only by a complete repair. Assuming that the underlying lifetime distribution of the system has a bathtub‐shaped failure rate function, upper and lower bounds for the optimal burn‐in time are provided. Furthermore, some other applications of optimal burn‐in are also considered. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004